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Essays
TENNIS WITH THE NET DOWN:
ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM WITHOUT
CONGRESS
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN†
ERNEST A. YOUNG††
Constitutional law is a funny subject for academics. As scholars,
we aspire to push forward the frontiers of knowledge—to make new
discoveries and to think about things in ways that no one has ever
thought of before. The metaphor of scientific discovery has always
been somewhat awkward in the social sciences—and perhaps even
more awkward in law—but surely we all hope to add something new
to the sum of human knowledge. We are not, to borrow a phrase from
1
Oliver North’s lawyer Brendan Sullivan, “just potted plants.”
Constitutional law, on the other hand, is all about old. A central
function of the Constitution in American law is to entrench certain
structures and rights against change, and every argument—even those
for progressive reform of our institutions—must be grounded in or at
least tenuously connected to a text drafted generations ago.
“Original” in other fields of inquiry means innovative or surprising; in
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1. Sullivan spoke up during his client North’s testimony and was told to be silent. Sullivan
responded, “I’m not a potted plant. I’m here as a lawyer. That’s my job.” Joint Hearings Before
S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and H.
Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. 100-7 Pt. I, 263
(1987) (testimony of Oliver L. North); see also Washington Talk: Briefing; Potted Plants Galore,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at B6.
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constitutional law “originalism” stands for a hidebound appeal to
history. The most creative arguments must somehow be couched in
terms designed to make them seem less daring and more consonant
with what has gone before.
Hence the temptation to just cut the cord. It is a truism that the
founders’ world is not ours, and the problems confronting our polity,
although not necessarily more difficult, are in many ways different.
Moreover, no matter how much brilliance and foresight we are willing
to ascribe to our constitutional founders, it would be surprising if all
the effort devoted to the study of political institutions over the past
two centuries had not yielded some progress. And to the extent that
we think we have identified a new problem or simply come up with a
better way, it is natural to want to reshape our institutions in
response—Constitution or no Constitution. It is hard not to start
tugging at the knots that bind us to the mast.
American politicians, lawyers, and judges have only partially
resisted this temptation. We have constructed a national security
constitution, for instance, that to a significant degree reflects the
responsibilities and vulnerabilities of a superpower in an age of
supersonic transport and weapons of mass destruction. On the
domestic side, we have a centralized administrative welfare state
exercising authority and undertaking responsibility in ways that
would have shocked the Framers. And this yields a second central
dilemma for constitutional scholars, powerfully put by Gary Lawson:
The actual structure and operation of the national government
today has virtually nothing to do with the Constitution. There is no
reasonable prospect that this circumstance will significantly improve
in the foreseeable future. If one is not prepared (as I am) to hold
fast to the Constitution though the heavens may fall, what is one
supposed to do with that knowledge?2
3

The thoughtful articles by Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld and
4
by Gillian Metzger, to which this brief Essay responds, offer one
possible answer to Professor Lawson’s question. Professors Galle and
Seidenfeld are eminently unwilling to sit with Lawson and watch the
2. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1249 (1994).
3. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008).
4. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023
(2008).
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heavens fall; they are, moreover, steeped in the latest learning on the
comparative competence of political, judicial, and bureaucratic
institutions. Consequently, they are willing to entertain arguments
that modern administrative agencies are, in fact, better vessels of
democratic values than Congress, and to acknowledge the claims of
federalism only if and to the extent that decentralizing authority
5
furthers some sort of public policy value. Similarly, Professor
Metzger accepts the value of federalism but argues that it should be
protected through the operation of ordinary principles of
6
administrative law. What both articles have in common—other than
their high quality—is that they shift the focus of federalism doctrine
from the structures established by the Constitution to the structures
established by the administrative state. To paraphrase their thesis in
Lawson’s terms, Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger have chosen to
“acknowledge openly and honestly, as did some of the architects of
the New Deal, that one cannot have allegiance both to the
7
administrative state and to the Constitution.”
For our own part, we are unwilling to adopt this “in for a penny,
in for a pound” approach to the modern administrative state. The two
of us often disagree profoundly about the degree of social, political,
8
and institutional change that is desirable in a polity, but that is a
dispute about the extent to which institutional structure ought to be
constitutionally entrenched. Neither of us has any doubt, however,
that the Constitution we actually have—which neither of us chose,
but with which both of us are stuck—does entrench certain structures,
like separation of powers and federalism. Both of these structural
principles are contestable and open-ended, and we might disagree
(albeit probably to a less fisticuffs-inducing extent) about their best
reading in many contexts. But we both think that contemporary
American lawyers have to maintain continuity with—to make some
sense of—the constitutional vision of separation of powers and
federalism notwithstanding the many profound changes to that
structure that have occurred since 1789. We worry, with Professor
Lawson, that “[i]f . . . one . . . follows the New Deal architects in

5. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1936–40.
6. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2028.
7. See Lawson, supra note 2, at 1253.
8. This disagreement has raged since the day we met, as coclerks in August 1995.
Professor Benjamin would characterize Professor Young as the most egregiously hidebound
variety of Burkean conservative; Professor Young thinks Professor Benjamin is a Jacobin.
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choosing the administrative state over the Constitution, one must also
acknowledge that all constitutional discourse is thereby rendered
9
problematic.”
The constitutional discourse that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld,
and Metzger propose in their contributions to this symposium
reminds us of a favorite observation from that noted administrative
law sage, Robert Frost. In a 1966 interview, Frost commented, “I’d as
10
soon write free verse as play tennis with the net down.” To our
minds, the brand of functionalism embraced by our interlocutors here
amounts to a similar disregard for the constraints that give meaning
to constitutionalism. Against this anti-Frostian perspective, we insist
that constitutional text, structure, history, and tradition impose
meaningful boundaries on the institutional structures available to
pursue federal policy goals. You can hit a wicked serve with the net
11
down, but you’re not playing tennis anymore.
Our response to these papers proceeds in three parts. Part I
considers Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s invocation of
“constitutional realism,” by which they seem to mean that
constitutional principle must give way to contemporary functional
12
realities. We think we can discern a similar notion implicit in
Professor Metzger’s idea of administrative law as a “federalism
surrogate”—that is, that the established constitutional structures can
be simply placed to one side and replaced with something else if those
established structures prove outmoded or ineffective as vehicles for
13
protecting more general constitutional values. Our discussion
compares this version with Karl Llewellyn’s quite different version of
14
constitutional realism, which emphasizes the extent to which
extratextual institutions and practices supplement the constitutional
“work” of the 1789 document but does not claim that the basic
principles of the canonical document could be simply shoved aside for
policy reasons. We like to think we are constitutional realists too, but

9. Lawson, supra note 2, at 1253.
10. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 295 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed.
1996).
11. In some variants of beer pong, for example, the net is removed from the ping pong
table in order to facilitate a very low and fast serve. See Dartmouth Beer Pong, WIKIPEDIA.COM
(available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_pong) (last visited May 31, 2008).
12. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1938–39.
13. See Metzger, supra note 4, at 2059.
14. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
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we prefer Professor Llewellyn’s version to the ones on offer
elsewhere in this symposium.
Part II focuses more specifically on questions of administrative
law and in particular administrative federalism. We discuss Professors
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger’s focus on agencies and why we think
it is inadequate. Expansive notions of the Commerce Clause have
largely cast aside the protections for states that dual federalism and
other mechanisms once offered, but conventional wisdom holds that
the states retain some measure of protection by way of the procedural
15
and political safeguards of federalism. On the separation of powers
side, the death of the nondelegation doctrine threatened to eviscerate
the central assumption that Congress makes the laws. As with
federalism, though, this problem has been thought to be mitigated by
Congress’s continued supremacy over agencies and the availability of
16
judicial review to enforce the statutory limits of agency authority.
We are largely willing to accept these rationales; we think, however,
that by elevating the administrative agency itself to the primary role,
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger shatter the fragile constitutional
compromises that allow present institutional arrangements to
maintain continuity with traditional constitutional structures.
In Part III we discuss how our approach differs from that of
Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger. In our view, the
touchstone of any analysis must be what Congress intended, not what
agencies can do to improve on Congress. This is not only oldfashioned but also may prove cumbersome for an agency that wants
to act quickly and (let us suppose) has states’ best interests at heart.
We thus concede that our approach might not be as conducive to
optimal policymaking as the alternative focus proposed by Galle,
Seidenfeld, and Metzger. (We do not think, however, that our
insistence on traditional structures would preclude adopting many of
the federalism-protective administrative mechanisms that our
colleagues champion here.) But the more traditional approach does

15. See infra Part III.A. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
16. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies,
questionable in light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the
Constitution, have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to
ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued.”).
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have the virtue of allowing us to call ourselves constitutional lawyers
and still look ourselves in the mirror each morning.
The central thrust of Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger’s
argument is to propose a different form of federalism to be enforced
through a different set of institutional mechanisms. This might be an
entirely sensible prescription for a new constitution in a newlyestablished federal system. But for us, constitutionalism means that
we are simply not free to choose whatever normative principles and
institutional strategies we think best. We must, to borrow a phrase
from our days in Texas, “dance with the girls that brung us.”
I. TWO KINDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REALISM
The anti-Frostian articles in this symposium represent a more
general trend in administrative law that focuses on federal agencies
themselves as the situs for protecting constitutional values such as
separation of powers, federalism, and democratic accountability. Our
friend Lisa Bressman’s work, for example, has questioned
conventional views of agencies as implementing a discernible intent
17
of Congress or as democratically accountable through an elected
18
president and has instead emphasized the importance of procedural
mechanisms at the agencies as a means of promoting political control
19
and preventing arbitrariness. A parallel trend in constitutional law
more generally emphasizes other nontextual institutional structures,
such as political parties, as vehicles for protecting constitutional
20
values. In each instance, the impulse is to look beyond the hardwired
features of the Constitution—such as Congress’s representational
features and lawmaking processes set forth in Article I—for alternate
institutional mechanisms.
17. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes in Light of Legislative Realities,
58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 8–10, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
[hereinafter Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes].
18. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 493–503 (2003).
19. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749, 1796–1804 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 234–52, 278–87 (2000) (arguing that federalism is best
protected by political party dynamics rather than judicial enforcement of textual limits on
Congress’s powers); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2385 (2006) (suggesting that “the separation of powers as the Framers
understood it . . . ha[s] ceased to exist” and that “[t]he enduring institutional form of democratic
political competition has turned out to be not branches but political parties”).
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This school of thought finds its ne plus ultra in the work of
Edward Rubin, who insists that
many of the basic concepts that we use to describe our current
government are the products of social nostalgia. The three branches
of government, power and discretion, democracy, legitimacy, law,
legal rights, human rights, and property are all ideas that originated
in pre-administrative times and that derive much of their continuing
appeal from their outdated origins. . . . [T]hese concepts are simply
not the most useful or meaningful ones that we could find to
describe contemporary government.21

Dean Rubin would thus replace much of the traditional discourse in
constitutional and administrative law with technocratic notions of
“administration,” institutional “microanalysis,” and a unified
22
governmental “network.” This analytical shift goes considerably
further than anything proposed by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and
Metzger, but it shares their impulse to set aside “outmoded”
constitutional structures and ways of thinking and replace them with
more “realistic” modes of analysis.
We find much to admire in this vein of scholarship, and we would
be the first to concede that extraconstitutional mechanisms play an
important role in the vindication of constitutional values. What
troubles us is the notion that the hardwired constitutional
mechanisms can be left behind or, failing that, pushed to the sidelines
in favor of more promising institutional strategies. The constitutional
structure builds in a vast amount of play in the joints, but we do think
attention to certain hardwired institutions and processes is
nonoptional. Prominent among them is the centrality of Congress’s
legislative decisions in our constitutional scheme. With respect to
changes in state authority, an agency’s role is whatever Congress
gives it, and no more. Congress’s choices are the touchstone.

21. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE 2 (2005). Although Dean Rubin does not mention federalism in this particular
passage, he has made his contempt for people who care about federalism clear in other work.
See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994) (“When federalism is raised as an argument against some
national policy, we generally reject it by whatever means are necessary, including, in one case,
killing its proponents [the Civil War]. This Article . . . asserts that, on grounds of political
morality, it has been exactly the right thing to do.”).
22. See RUBIN, supra note 21, at 22–36 (administration); id. at 18 (microanalysis); id. at 48–
53 (networks).
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In making this point, we do not propose to quarrel in detail
(much) with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s comparative
institutional analysis or with Professor Metzger’s account of the
Supreme Court’s administrative law decisions. (We are not entirely
convinced on either score, but point-by-point refutation is not our
interest here.) Nor do we propose to offer a detailed affirmative
account of how we would address problems of federalism in the
administrative state, such as the preemptive powers of federal
agencies. One of us has addressed the administrative preemption
23
question in detail elsewhere, but we despair of ever agreeing on
24
particular doctrinal prescriptions. What we think we can agree on is
a more general approach to these questions as a matter of
constitutional theory. We begin, therefore, with a crucial distinction
that is explicit in the Galle and Seidenfeld article and seems to be
implicit in the Metzger article—the distinction between constitutional
realism and formalism.
A. The Anti-Frostian Take on the Structural Constitution
Although Professors Galle and Seidenfeld invoke “constitutional
25
legal realism,” they do not spend much time fleshing out what they
mean. What we take them to mean is that legal structures must reflect
the functional realities of effective governance—as opposed to the
“formal” requirements grounded in constitutional text and history.
The proper allocation of authority between administrative agencies,
courts, and Congress thus turns on a sophisticated and nuanced
evaluation of comparative institutional competence, and that
competence is directed toward protecting federalism only to the
extent that federalism “improve[s] the regulatory process”—there is
no independent normative significance to “the preservation of state
26
regulatory prerogatives per se.” We think it is thus fair to say that
the Galle and Seidenfeld view has two components: (1) contemporary
institutional structures should take whatever form best promotes the
relevant public values, and (2) those values are defined in
consequentialist terms (“improving the regulatory process”) rather
than in terms of fidelity to some value handed down from the
constitutional Framers.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008).
And frankly, this is something of a pleasant surprise.
Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1994.
Id. at 1949.
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This formulation may sound a bit more radical than anything
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld have come right out and said in their
article, but we think it is a fair generalization from their particular
claims and, more fundamentally, the method by which they support
those claims. The entire point of the Galle and Seidenfeld article is to
attack doctrines requiring federal intrusions on state regulatory
authority to come from Congress, rather from federal administrative
27
agencies, the most prominent of which is the presumption against
28
preemption. These doctrines, Galle and Seidenfeld argue, are
misguided because agencies are in fact more transparent, deliberative,
and accountable than Congress and because agencies are better at
determining the allocation of regulatory authority that will promote
29
good policy outcomes. They give zero attention to claims that the
Constitution may simply require Congress to make these calls, not
because Galle and Seidenfeld are unaware of such arguments but
because such arguments do not count in their jurisprudential world.
As they frankly acknowledge, “[t]he story we have given so far
depends on a willingness to acknowledge that the legal realism that
animates administrative law also should inform constitutional
30
doctrine.” The alternative, in their view, is a kind of “formalism”
31
that is blind to institutional realities.
Although Professor Metzger does not explicitly invoke legal
realism, it seems reasonable to attribute to her much the same view,
at least with respect to the fungibility of institutional structures. Her
very title—Administrative Law as the New Federalism—suggests the

27. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld explain the crux of their argument:
That problem, of course, raises a question of its own: who best to decide how best to
divide [power between states and the federal government]? With some modest
exceptions, most courts and commentators have looked to Congress. Federal courts
have done little to limit federal power directly. Instead, they have insisted on rules
that give primacy to Congress, but also impose some burden on Congress to make
good decisions. We argue in this Article that this allocation is a mistake, and that
instead federal agencies should often be the preferred institutions in which to vest the
authority to allocate power between states and the federal government.
See id. at 1936 (footnote omitted).
28. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). On the tension between
the Rice presumption and doctrines of deference to agencies, see, for example, Damien J.
Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87
GEO. L.J. 263, 264, 268–74 (1998).
29. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1992.
30. Id. at 1994.
31. See id. We doubt that “formalism” is the right word for the view that Professors Galle
and Seidenfeld oppose. See infra text accompanying notes 71–78.
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replacement of outmoded institutional structures (which may just
happen to be in the Constitution) with new governance
32
arrangements. And Metzger’s central thesis is to suggest that
administrative law may function as a “surrogate” for constitutional
federalism, protecting values of state autonomy via the workings of
the administrative state in lieu of either judicially-enforced
substantive limitations on national power or adherence to political or
33
process limits. Unlike Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, Professor
Metzger does not appear to dismiss these more traditional limitations
as obsolescent formalism; she does, however, think that constitutional
constraints are largely beside the point in administrative federalism
cases because the Supreme Court has construed the relevant
34
constitutional limitations so broadly. And she insists that “for
federalism to have continued vibrancy as a governing principle, it
needs to be ‘normalized’ and consciously incorporated into the day35
to-day functioning of the federal administrative state.” The original
Constitution may have envisioned a particular set of political and
procedural safeguards for state autonomy, but—in Metzger’s view—
contemporary interpreters remain free to substitute another set of
surrogate safeguards if those alternative structures would better
36
promote public values.
The second component of the view we have ascribed to our
interlocutors—that the public values to be enforced by institutional
structures should be defined in consequentialist terms—is easier to
establish. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld begin by pointing out that
37
“there is really not one federalism but two” :
One form, which some commentators have termed “abstract
federalism,” can be thought of as political or rights oriented. In this

32. Cf. Wikipedia, The New Black, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_new_black (last visited
May 31, 2008) (“‘_____ is the new black’ is a catch phrase and snowclone used to indicate the
sudden popularity or versatility of an idea at the expense of the popularity of a second idea. It is
also the origin of a snowclone of the form ‘X is the new Y.’”). For those not hip enough to know
what a “snowclone” is, see Glen Whitman, Phrases for Lazy Writers in Kit Form Are the New
Clichés, AGORAPHILIA, http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2004_01_11_agoraphilia_archive.html#
107412842921919301 (Jan. 14, 2004, 17:00).
33. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2070.
34. See id. at 2045–48. For an example, see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2201
(2005) (construing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to reach in-state,
noncommercial production of medical marijuana).
35. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2087.
36. Id. at 2093.
37. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1941.

03__BENJAMIN_YOUNG.DOC

10/22/2008 10:16:51 AM

2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITHOUT CONGRESS

2121

conception, federalism preserves the states as a source of power that
rivals the federal government, so that competition between the two
for the loyalty of the public constrains any tendency towards tyranny
or other bad behavior. The second, economic conception, values
federalism because—and only to the extent that—it may tend to
increase overall national welfare or utility.38
39

As the language we have already quoted suggests, Galle and
Seidenfeld have little use for abstract federalism. When they analyze
the comparative competence of institutions to protect federalism,
“the issue is not which institution best enables state influence over
regulation, but rather which institution fosters state influence that will
enhance public welfare, and not simply state officials’ opportunities
40
for rent seeking.” This approach is diametrically opposed to that of
someone like Justice O’Connor, who insisted that “[o]ur task would
be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no
advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system
of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set
41
forth in the Constitution.” For Galle and Seidenfeld, federalism is
purely instrumental, and its claims extend only insofar as it “may tend
42
to increase national welfare or utility.” The value of constitutional
fidelity espoused by Justice O’Connor has no independent weight in
43
this analysis.
Pinning this consequentialist label on Professor Metzger’s article
44
is harder, but we have our suspicions. Metzger seems to accept an

38. Id. at 1941–42 (footnotes omitted).
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1949.
41. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
42. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1942; see also id. at 2021 (“We have argued that the
realist view of federalism recognizes that the principle of limited federal power is an
instrumental one.”).
43. See id. at 1949 (stating that their analysis “credits the availability of dual sovereignty
only as a functional matter—that is, only when that availability is related to regulatory outcomes
and not simply out of some posited formalistic preference for protection of dual sovereignty”).
44. Consequentialism may be endemic to administrative law experts (although Justice
Scalia seems to have avoided the bug thus far). See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 18 (2005) (“Since law is connected to life,
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including
‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’”
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109 (3d ed. 1960))); Ken I. Kersch, Justice
Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 766 (2006) (characterizing Justice Breyer’s
jurisprudence as driven by attention to the purposes of legislation and the consequences of
resolving disputes about those purposes in particular ways).
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obligation to protect federalism as part of the constitutional
enterprise; her proposal is simply that one set of institutions (ordinary
administrative processes) are better suited to promote that value than
another (judicial insistence that Congress make the decision to
supplant state law). In this sense, then, we may read Metzger as
adopting the first part of Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s position
but not the second. On the other hand, Metzger strikes us as
particularly fainthearted about promoting federalism in any way that
45
might limit federal authorities’ ability to achieve their policy goals.
This suggests an implicit consequentialism similar to that of Galle and
Seidenfeld: federalism is a value only to the extent that it does not
46
pose a cost in terms of social utility.
As we have already suggested, the setting aside of constitutional
constraints that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger propose
47
brings to mind Robert Frost’s criticism of free verse. Although we
would be the first to concede that constitutional text, history, and
tradition leave a great deal of play in the joints—indeed, a great deal
of room for Galle and Seidenfeld-style analysis of comparative
48
institutional competence —the constraints of text, history, and
tradition nonetheless form the net across which constitutional tennis
must be played. Like Frost, we find the game unrecognizable (and not
much fun) in the absence of these constraints. Nor do we accept that
one must adopt the anti-Frostian view represented by Galle,
Seidenfeld, and Metzger as part of any “realistic” approach to
jurisprudence. We develop our own view of “constitutional realism”
in the next Section.

45. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2073.
46. Put more precisely, federalism itself has no inherent value to weigh against any
decrease in utility that might result from interference with federal policy goals.
47. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 308–17 (2007) (applying
comparative institutional analysis to patent law); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism
Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1733, 1740–58 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism Doctrine] (arguing that
the Constitution’s provision for federalism allows sufficient room for courts to make
“compensating adjustments” over time); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65–122 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms] (applying
comparative institutional analysis to federalism doctrine).
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B. Llewellyn’s Realism and the Constitution Outside the Constitution
Although we often think of legal realism as primarily a private
law phenomenon, the realists also had important things to say about
public law. A leading example—and one that echoes some of the
concerns of this symposium’s articles—is Karl Llewellyn’s essay on
49
The Constitution as an Institution. This essay draws on the basic
realist distinction between the “law in the books” and the “law in
50
action” to understand the “Constitution” as encompassing not
simply the canonical text but also the large set of statutes, regulations,
practices, and norms that have grown up around the text to give
shape and life to the institutions of actual governance. Hence,
Professor Llewellyn derides as “extraordinary” the “notion that the
primary source of information as to what our Constitution comes to,
is the language of a certain Document of 1789, together with a
severely select coterie of additional paragraphs called
51
Amendments.” Llewellyn instead seeks to identify the elements of a
“working constitution,” and he insists that “[a]s a criterion of what
our working Constitution is, the language fails in both directions. It
52
affords neither a positive nor a negative test.” This working
constitution includes, for example, subconstitutional rules like the
voting rules in the Senate and even informal norms such as the pre–
Twenty-Second Amendment understanding that presidents would
53
generally serve no more than two terms.
It is worth pausing for a moment to ask what is really “realist”
about Professor Llewellyn’s working constitution. Lawyers commonly
think of legal realism as focused on indeterminacy in the law.
According to Brian Leiter, the realists meant two things by
indeterminacy:
first, that the law was rationally indeterminate, in the sense that the
available class of legal reasons did not justify a unique decision (at
least in those cases that reached the stage of appellate review); but
second, that the law was also causally or explanatorily

49. Llewellyn, supra note 14.
50. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 61 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2003)
(noting “a disjunction between the ‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in action’” as characteristic of
legal realism).
51. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 3.
52. Id. at 15.
53. See id. at 15–17.
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indeterminate, in the sense that legal reasons did not suffice to
explain why judges decided as they did.54

One might, we suppose, understand Llewellyn’s notion of a working
constitution as a claim that the canonical document is “causally or
explanatorily indeterminate”—that is, that the canonical document
does not suffice to explain the governing institutions that we actually
have. There is something to this, as Llewellyn plainly set out to
debunk traditional legal culture’s focus on the canonical text. But
Llewellyn’s claim—at least in this work—is not that the canonical
constitution was indeterminate (in either sense) with respect to the
matters it addresses, but rather that it is incomplete—that it fails to
address any number of important issues of governance, and that other
rules and practices have grown up around the canonical document to
fill these gaps. This position has little to do with what Professor Leiter
calls the “core claim” of legal realism: “in deciding cases, judges
respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than
55
to legal rules and reasons.” In fact, Llewellyn’s claim about the
Constitution has little to do with deciding cases at all. Rather, it is a
general claim about the relative unimportance of the divide between
“constitutional” and “ordinary” law in structuring the way our
institutions operate outside the courts.
What is “realist” about Professor Llewellyn’s idea of a working
constitution is its empiricism and its disregard of formal categories of
56
law in favor of how law actually operates in practice. For Llewellyn,
“[a] realist is one who, no matter what his ideological or philosophical
views, believes that it is important regularly to focus attention on the
law in action at any given time and to try to describe as honestly and
57
clearly as possible what is to be seen.” Part of this is a claim about
the importance of norms not formally enshrined in binding law: much

54. Leiter, supra note 50, at 51.
55. Id. at 52; see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 123
(1995) (“[T]he realist assumption . . . was that judges—stimulated, primarily, by the facts before
them rather than by the rules to which those facts might be fitted—work backwards ‘from a
desirable conclusion to one or another of a stock of logical premises.’” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,
359 (1925))).
56. See DUXBURY, supra note 55, at 71 (“‘Realism’ describes accurately what was possibly
the single unifying ambition of so-called realists: namely, the commitment to candour, to telling
it—whatever ‘it’ happened to be—as it is.”).
57. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 74 (rev. ed.
1985).

03__BENJAMIN_YOUNG.DOC

10/22/2008 10:16:51 AM

2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITHOUT CONGRESS

2125

as Llewellyn thinks that judges enforce the norms of commercial
58
culture in commercial cases, he also thinks that informal norms play
59
an important role in constituting the government. But many aspects
of the working constitution are “hard” law—that is, statutes,
legislative rules, and the like. And these provisions of law may
operate in a highly determinate sense. The realist point is simply that,
in order to appreciate the full scope of our constitutive institutional
arrangements, one has to set aside the formal category of
“constitutional law” and look at the roles that various sorts of legal
60
measures actually play in the system.
One of us recently sought to develop Professor Llewellyn’s
conception by drawing an analogy to the British constitutional
tradition, which lacks a single document codifying the polity’s
constitutive institutional arrangements and entrenching those
61
arrangements against change. In the British tradition, “constitutional
law” is defined by function rather than form; a law is part of the
Constitution if it performs a constitutive function—e.g., establishing
an institution or conferring rights on individuals. Accordingly “the
Constitution” consists simply of all the laws and practices that
62
perform these functions. As Professor Llewellyn suggests, our own
American Constitution can be thought of in much the same way: our
“working constitution” consists not only of the original document and
its formal amendments, but also laws like the 1789 Judiciary Act (and
its subsequent amendments) that established the federal courts, the
various civil rights statutes conferring important rights on individuals

58. See Leiter, supra note 50, at 58. Norms play a significant role in many areas of law (and
legal scholarship). See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 88–115 (1999) (discussing the role of
norms in science).
59. The obvious analogy is to the use of “conventions” in the British system. See ADAM
TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 10–12 (2003).
60. See DUXBURY, supra note 55, at 96–97 (stressing the empiricism of the realists).
61. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Outside the Constitution]. On the British Constitution, see
TOMKINS, supra note 59, at 1–30. For a similar analogy between Llewellyn’s realism and New
Zealand’s unwritten constitution, see Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to
Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
587 (2006). We note that our other coclerk, Heather Gerken, has been kind enough to describe
Professor Young’s article as a “signal[] that the end of the world is nigh.” Heather K. Gerken,
The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic
Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 932 (2007).
62. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 22–23 (8th ed. 1915).
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(including rights against government action) that go beyond the rights
articulated in the Bill of Rights, and practices such as the internal
House and Senate rules that establish the committee structure and
rules for voting on legislation.
An important difference between our system and Britain’s, of
course, is that elements of our constitutive arrangements—those that
are a part of the canonical document—are entrenched against change
63
through “ordinary” legislation. But we think that difference is less
critical, in most circumstances, than people sometimes think. For one
thing, formal entrenchment of the Article V variety is not the only
thing that makes a legal norm hard to change; it seems much more
likely, for instance, that we will see in our lifetime a constitutional
amendment to allow the prohibition of flag burning than a repeal of
64
the Social Security program. But more important is the fact that the
canonical Constitution simply does not speak to a very great number
of constitutive issues in any significant degree of detail. It leaves those
issues for ordinary legislation to work out. We are convinced,
moreover, that this is a feature, not a bug, in our system: it leaves the
great bulk of our institutional arrangements open to change and
65
adaptation over time. Bruce Ackerman is thus right to say that the
“constitution” has been amended over the course of our history
66
outside the Article V process, but we think those amendments have
occurred much more frequently and incrementally than they do in his

63. For an argument that British law is beginning to reflect a distinction between ‘higher’
and ‘ordinary’ law, see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD & SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (2000).
64. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 426–28.
65. Our great friend Sanford Levinson has argued that this perspective understates the
extent to which, on certain critical issues like the malapportionment of the Senate or the
distortions that the Electoral College produces, the canonical text does amount to an “iron
cage” that prevents necessary reforms. See Sanford Levinson, Reconsidering the Syllabus in
“Constitutional Law,” 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 7, 9–10 (2008), http://thepocketpart.
org/2008/05/16/levinson.html. We are not nearly as worked up about those problems as
Professor Levinson, but in any event we suspect that extracanonical reforms can in fact fix or at
least mitigate many of them. See Ernest A. Young, Curricula and Complacency: A Response to
Professor Levinson, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 12, 15 & n.15 (2008),
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/05/16/young.html (pointing out, for example, that a proposed
interstate compact could render the popular vote decisive in presidential elections with the
concurrence of as few as eleven states).
66. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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account. In particular, they have occurred through “ordinary”
67
legislation rather than “higher lawmaking.”
The administrative state is surely part of this “constitution
outside the Constitution.” The great organic statutes that establish
and empower the various agencies—the Communications Act of
1934, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Clean Air and Water
Acts, and other key environmental laws—are all quintessentially
constitutive statutes. These laws establish enduring institutions of
governance; their preemption and savings clauses sketch the
boundary of state and federal power; they confer both substantive
and procedural rights upon individuals. The Administrative
Procedure Act and executive orders allocating power between the
agencies and the White House play similar constitutive roles that cut
across multiple areas of regulatory action. We suspect that a
constitution that tried to entrench the level of institutional detail
represented in these statutes would prove insufficiently flexible to
endure over time. We differ from Karl Llewellyn, then, to the extent
that he suggested that the working constitution should be “not subject
68
to abrogation or material alteration.” Much of the utility of our
extracanonical constitution derives from the fact that it can be
changed through ordinary legislative processes or even more informal
means in response to the shifting needs of society.
Having embraced the institutional flexibility of the
administrative state, then, why do we reject the vision of
administrative federalism advanced by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld,
and Metzger? Although we would follow Professor Llewellyn in
acknowledging how much of our “constitution” consists of ordinary
law, subject to alteration and adaptation in response to contemporary
circumstances, we think our interlocutors improperly disregard the
role of the canonical, entrenched Constitution. To return to our
Frostian analogy, we admit that most of what is interesting about
tennis consists in angles, spin, power, and position—it has little to do
69
with the net. So it is with the structural constitution: the canonical

67. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 448–59; see also Ernest A.
Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399 (2008).
68. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 29.
69. Or so we infer from watching people who are actually good at tennis. On the rare
occasions when we play, the net plays an extremely significant role. Most of our shots end up
there.
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text does not determine most of the interesting institutional design
questions, and contemporary political actors enjoy significant
70
discretion to order things to their liking. But certain key entrenched
requirements remain, and our concern is that our anti-Frostian
friends have impermissibly set them aside. Tennis with the net down
isn’t really tennis at all.
C. Formalism, Functionalism, and Constitutionalism
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld reject this view—that the
Constitution simply requires a focus on Congress, regardless of the
possibility that administrative agencies may have superior
institutional competence—as a kind of “formalism.” As Lawrence
Solum has noted, however, “[t]he terms ‘formalism’ and ‘formalist’
are thrown around quite a bit, but they turn out to be surprisingly
71
difficult to define.” It is worth pausing for a moment to assess the
senses in which our position is and is not formalist, as that inquiry
may help illumine the extent and limits of our disagreement with our
interlocutors.
Leading definitions of “formalism” involve excluding various
sorts of considerations from legal decisions. Frederick Schauer’s
influential account, for example, equates formalism with rule-based
decisionmaking:
At the heart of the word “formalism,” in many of its numerous uses,
lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule. Formalism is
the way in which rules achieve their “ruleness” precisely by doing
what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a

70. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting that presidential authority is almost always a function of
the consistency of executive action with congressional legislation); Ernest A. Young, Toward a
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93, 95–100 (2007) (suggesting
that structural questions concerning the relationship between domestic and supranational courts
are largely undetermined by the canonical Constitution and should be resolved through
framework legislation).
71. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and Instrumentalism, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON, http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043formalism-and.html (May 22, 2005, 14:10); see also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509, 509–10 (1988) (“Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is
for decisions in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism is,
it is not good.”).
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decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would
otherwise take into account.72

On this account, the opposite of formalism is standard-based
decisionmaking, under which a decisionmaker applying a legal
directive may have direct recourse to that directive’s underlying
73
reasons. We take Professors Galle and Seidenfeld to mean
something similar by “functionalism”—that is, they contend that the
allocation of authority between Congress and administrative agencies
should be settled not by the constitutional principle that the
74
Constitution vests legislative authority in Congress, but rather by
assessing more directly whether Congress or agencies better promote
75
the Constitution’s underlying values. They assert, for example, that
an assertion of “exclusive judicial or congressional power to decide
the appropriate scope of national authority” would be illegitimate
because such an assertion “cannot be squared with the basic
76
rationales of federalism,” not because such an assertion would be an
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions.
Our contrasting view legitimately may be characterized as
“formalist” in the following sense: we think that if the Constitution is
fairly read to vest decisionmaking responsibility in Congress, then it is
not open to us to inquire whether underlying constitutional values
might be better served by vesting that responsibility elsewhere. But
this kind of formalism is inherent in the very notion of
constitutionalism itself. It is exactly the same idea that keeps us from

72. Schauer, supra note 71, at 510; see also Solum, supra note 71 (“The core idea of
formalism is that the law (constitutions, statutes, regulations, and precedent) provide[s] rules
and that these rules can, do, and should provide a public standard for what is lawful (or not).”).
Adrian Vermeule has identified “two senses of formalism,” both of which involve limiting the
considerations available to a decisionmaker: first, an “attempt to deduce legal rules from
intelligible essences, such as ‘the nature of contracts’ or ‘the rule of law,’ while excluding
considerations of morality and policy,” and second, a “rule-bound decision-making strategy,”
under which “judges . . . should restrict the range of information they attempt to collect and
reduce the complexity of their behavioral repertoire.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006).
73. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like
when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation.”).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
75. Cf. Schauer, supra note 71, at 537 (“Understanding the way in which rules truncate the
range of reasons available to a decisionmaker helps us to appreciate the distinction between
formalism and functionalism, or instrumentalism.”).
76. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1939.
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asking in every Fifth Amendment case whether the Constitution’s
underlying norms are really well served by a principle foreclosing selfincrimination (much less whether those underlying norms are the
right norms to have). That refusal to require that constitutional
directives be justified anew in every case is part of what it means to
say that the Constitution is entrenched.
To say, however, that that we must do whatever the Constitution
requires, without examining its underlying justifications, is not to say
that we should interpret the meaning of those constitutional
requirements in a formalist way. For example, one could vindicate the
principle that all agency authority must ultimately be traced back to
Congress by requiring a formal “clear statement” of delegation in the
text of the statute, but one could also argue, as Lisa Bressman does,
that finding broad delegations to agencies whenever certain
functional considerations are present best implements Congress’s
77
intentions. If the constitutional principle is simply that Congress’s
intent must be followed, one might adopt either formalist or
78
functionalist approaches to ascertaining that intent.
Our disagreement with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld—not to
mention Professors Metzger and Bressman—may well extend to
questions of constitutional meaning, such as the proper interpretation
of the Constitution’s lawmaking provisions. The important point for
present purposes, however, is that that disagreement would not be a
disagreement about realism or about formalism. We are entirely open
to the need to assess constitutional structure in realist terms, and in
many respects we are willing to interpret that structure in a
functionalist way. Where we jump off the train is at the proposition
that the Constitution’s hardwired provisions, however construed, may
somehow be subordinated to its underlying values or, even worse, to
consequentialist notions of good policy.
II. THE LEGITIMATING ROLE
OF CONGRESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
So far we have sketched a contrast between two different realist
views of how the structural constitution changes in response to

77. See Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes, supra note 17 (manuscript at 46).
78. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 72, at 33 (“[T]he best reading of the Constitution is
that interpretive formalism and interpretive anti-formalism are constitutionally optional for
judges.”).
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changing conditions over time. Our own Frostian view is that the
Constitution leaves many institutional questions open to be resolved
by a more mutable “constitution outside the Constitution,” but that
the features that the canonical Constitution does speak to must be
respected. The anti-Frostian view that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld,
and Metzger espouse, on the other hand, holds that contemporary
actors are free to adopt whatever structures seem likely to best realize
public values and that (at least for Galle and Seidenfeld) those values
are essentially consequentialist in character. This is a general
disagreement about constitutional theory, but it arises in a very
specific context concerning the means by which federalism may be
protected in the modern administrative state. In this Part, we apply
the somewhat abstract points developed above to this specific dispute
about administrative federalism.
A. Foundational Considerations in Administrative Federalism
It may be a stretch to say that the issue of administrative
federalism will ever be “hot,” but for a complicated issue of
intergovernmental relations involving intricate matters of statutory
construction and administrative law, the topic has attracted a
79
surprising amount of interest lately. One reason is that although the
Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival” generated a great deal of
80
academic interest in federalism, an emerging consensus recognizes

79. In addition to this symposium, many of the articles in the Northwestern Law Review’s
2008 symposium on preemption engaged that question in an administrative context. See, e.g.,
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008);
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008);
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 841 (2008);
Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 23; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and
Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption];
Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory
Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1995); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble]. On preemption more generally, see the essays
in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
80. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle? 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998) (coining the term “federalist revival”). The
leading cases on the (canonical) constitutional side are Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state executive officers by requiring them
to enforce federal law), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress
may not, when using its Article I powers, abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from private
suits for money damages), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the
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that the Court’s holdings under the Commerce Clause,
anticommandeering doctrine, and Eleventh Amendment are likely to
make considerably less difference than how the Court approaches
81
questions of statutory and administrative preemption. Another
source of the current interest lies in the Bush administration’s
aggressive assertions of executive power, and in particular its use of
administrative agency action to achieve policy goals that it could not
82
achieve through the legislative process. Finally, the Supreme Court
has decided a string of cases all involving—but none definitively
resolving—basic questions concerning the role of federal
administrative agencies in the federal system, with another pair of
83
potentially defining decisions teed up for next term.
One set of questions in administrative federalism focuses on the
quality and processes of decisionmaking at the agency. For example:

federal Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). For a
general account of this line of cases, see Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at 23–32.
81. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(observing that preemption cases present “the true test of federalist principle”); Calvin Massey,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (underscoring
preemption’s significant implications for federalism); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at
130–34 (attempting to place preemption at “the center of our federalism debates”).
82. See, e.g., Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 227–28 (describing an
administrative process of “silent tort reform”); Joel Brinkley, Out of Spotlight, Bush Overhauls
U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/14/politics/
14bush.html?ex=1250136000&en=1bf32d7574b25b2b&ei=5090)
(discussing
the
Bush
administration’s expansive use of agency authority). For additional citations, see Metzger, supra
note 4, at 2025 n.3.
83. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (avoiding
deciding how much deference to accord agency preemption determinations by basing the
Court’s holding that state law was preempted on the Court’s independent interpretation of the
underlying statute); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–21 (2006) (refusing to defer to the
attorney general’s interpretation of the Controlled Substance Act as authorizing regulations
preempting Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 883 (2000) (placing “some weight” on the agency’s conclusion that state law posed an
obstacle to executing federal policy); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495–97 (1996)
(giving “substantial weight” to the Food and Drug Administration’s construction of the Medical
Devices Amendments not to preempt the Lohrs’ claims); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (deferring to an agency’s construction of a statute in a preemption case, but
distinguishing “the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute
[from] the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive” and “assum[ing] (without deciding) that
the latter question must always be decided de novo by the courts”). The new cases are Altria
Group, Inc. v Good, 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (raising
questions concerning, inter alia, the scope of agency authority to preempt state law by informal
action), and Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 192–94 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118
(2008) (raising the question of how much deference is due a federal agency’s interpretation of
its decisions’ preemptive effect).
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If an agency can preempt state law in the exercise of a general
delegated authority, should preemptive effect be limited to agency
84
actions of a particular kind—e.g., notice-and-comment rulemaking?
What should be the effect of agencies’ failure to comply with
executive orders mandating that they consider the federalism impacts
85
of proposed actions before reaching a final decision?
Those questions assume a focus on agencies. More foundational
are questions involving the relationship between the agency and
Congress. Some of these concern the authority of federal
administrative agencies to preempt state law. For instance, when a
federal administrative agency interprets an ambiguous federal statute
as preempting state law, is the agency’s interpretation entitled to
86
judicial deference? If so, what degree of deference? Relatedly, to
what extent can Congress delegate the authority to preempt state law
on the agency’s own initiative? How clearly must such delegations be
stated? Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger largely focus on
this second set of questions.
In our view, answering the second set of questions must start
with Congress. To be sure, the Court has acknowledged Congress’s
ability to delegate significant powers to administrative agencies. As
87
Justice White pointed out in dissent in INS v. Chadha:
[T]he sheer amount of law—the substantive rules that regulate
private conduct and direct the operation of government—made by
the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by
Congress through the traditional process. There is no question but
that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic
sense of the term.88

But without denying the truth of Justice White’s statement, the Court
has always insisted that administrative agency action be grounded in
and defended in terms of the action of Congress itself. Hence, in
Chadha, the majority responded that

84. See Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 23, 891–92, 899 (suggesting that it
should).
85. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 79, at 782–85 (discussing
agencies’ generally miserable record of compliance with such orders).
86. See id. at 739–43 (parsing this question and recommending that Skidmore, not Chevron,
deference applies); Merrill, supra note 79, at 728–30 (recommending that courts adopt a
preemption-specific deference analysis).
87. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
88. Id. at 985–86 (White, J., dissenting).
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[e]xecutive action under legislatively delegated authority that might
resemble “legislative” action in some respects . . . . is always subject
to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that
authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the
power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely.89

Chadha was not a preemption case, but its rigorous insistence on
the primacy of the Article I lawmaking process has important
implications for administrative preemption issues. We contend that
the Constitution requires that the central decision to preempt state
law be meaningfully traceable to Congress—not simply to the will of
the agency itself. This flows from the structure of the Constitution.
Indeed, it is hardwired into the Supremacy Clause. That provision
confers the status of supreme federal law only on three sorts of
enactments: the Constitution; “the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
90
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States.”
Administrative regulations, adjudicatory rulings, and the like are not
“Laws of the United States” within this language because they are not
made “in Pursuance” of the legislative process laid out in Article I;
rather, their effect as supreme federal law is necessarily parasitic
upon the supremacy of the underlying statutes that authorize
administrative action. Further, Article I, section One vests “[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United
91
States,” and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
particular lawmaking procedures specified in that Article are not
92
subject to modification through ordinary legislation. All supreme
legislative authority, then, stems from Congress acting through
93
specified procedures.
This point does not mean that administrative actions cannot be
“law” under the Supremacy Clause. Rather, we simply insist that
agency actions have the status of supreme law because they are made
pursuant to delegations from Congress; the force of agency actions is
89. Id. at 953–54 n.16 (majority opinion).
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
92. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998) (striking down the line-item
veto); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (striking down the legislative veto).
93. As we discuss in Part III, the Court has implemented this principle through developing
a variety of “clear statement” requirements that insulate the states from federal interference
absent explicit congressional decisions to the contrary. See infra notes 135–38 and accompanying
text.
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94

derivative, not primary. We think the Court put it reasonably well in
95
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC:
[A] federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.
This is true for at least two reasons. First, an agency literally has no
power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a
sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.
Second, the best way of determining whether Congress intended the
regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to
examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress
to the agency.96

This will strike many as an obvious point, but even obvious points can
do some work. Congress is the touchstone, and that suggests a quite
different focus from that suggested by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld,
and Metzger.
That does not mean that the first set of questions are not
important, or even that those are not also constitutional questions—in
the sense that the answers to those questions are not also constitutive
of the functional relationship between the nation and the states. We
do insist that the answers to the second set of questions must flow
from the guideposts created by the entrenched, canonical
constitution. An analysis of the constitutional guideposts is thus not
optional in the sense that the first set of questions might be. And that
is the nub of our disagreement with Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and
Metzger.

94. It may be helpful to compare the status of federal agency action with that of federal
common law, which may also preempt state law in the event of a conflict. We doubt anyone
would say, however, that judge-made rules that fill gaps in federal statutes, for example, are the
same as the federal statutes themselves. As one of us has demonstrated elsewhere, the
preemptive force of federal common law derives from the supremacy of the underlying federal
legislative enactments. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 125).
95. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
96. Id. at 374. The Supreme Court came closest to equating administrative regulations and
federal statutes in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982),
stating that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes,” id. at
153. But the Court immediately turned its focus back to Congress by noting that “Congress has
directed [the] administrator to exercise his discretion” and that the administrator’s actions were
“subject to judicial review . . . to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority.”
Id. at 153–54; see also id. at 152 (“The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in the
Supremacy Clause, requires us to examine congressional intent.” (citation omitted)). Nothing in
de la Cuesta suggests that agency actions have preemptive force apart from underlying
congressional action.
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B. Shifting the Focus to Agencies
Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger reason that agencies
are no worse, and probably better, decisionmakers than Congress in
determining whether state laws should be preempted. Galle and
Seidenfeld, in particular, emphasize several dimensions of
comparative institutional competence that, in their view, favor federal
agencies over Congress and the courts as the venue for contemporary
federalism debates. Agencies, they say, are more deliberative,
97
transparent, and accountable than Congress. Metzger likewise
contends that “[n]umerous factors, such as congressional oversight,
federal officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political
organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve
to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency
decisionmaking,” and she emphasizes that “administrative law [may]
offer[] adequate protection against agency failure to take federalism
98
concerns seriously.”
The specific doctrinal conclusions that both articles seem to draw
from these insights strike us as relatively modest. Professors Galle
and Seidenfeld would reject the “trend of modern doctrine toward
requiring in all cases clear congressional authorization for preemption
99
or other expansions of federal power.” Professor Metzger focuses
less on critique than on developing the notion that ordinary
administrative law may protect federalism interests, but she likewise
seems to reject requirements “that Congress . . . clearly authorize
100
burdens that administrative agencies impose on the states.” Our
focus in this reply is not on the specific rejection of clear statement
rules, but rather on the sort of analysis that forms the basis for that
conclusion.
In particular, we reject the notion that administrative federalism
should focus on the agencies rather than Congress. That notion
emerges most clearly at the beginning of the Galle and Seidenfeld
article:
Federal courts . . . have insisted upon rules that give primacy to, but
also impose some burden upon, Congress to make good decisions.
Our goal in this article is to show that this allocation is a mistake,

97.
98.
99.
100.

Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1939.
Metzger, supra note 4, at 2072, 2080.
Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1940.
Metzger, supra note 4, at 2095.
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and that instead federal agencies should often be the preferred
institution in which we should vest authority to allocate power
between states and the federal government.101

Similarly, Metzger would shift the focus of administrative federalism
from the constitutionally-prescribed role of Congress to agency
decisionmaking and administrative law:
One central implication is that the Court should apply
administrative law doctrines with an eye to reinforcing agency
attentiveness to state interests. Another is that addressing
federalism concerns through ordinary administrative law may often
prove more effective than devising special federalism-inspired
doctrines.102

Significantly, Metzger concludes that “federalism . . . needs to be
‘normalized’ and incorporated into the day-to-day functioning of the
103
federal administrative state.”
As we have already suggested, our interlocutors’ approach
addresses the ends of constitutional structure—the protection of
federalism or of other democratic values—while sidelining particular
institutional mechanisms that the constitutional text prescribes for
meeting those ends. Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger
suggest that if agencies can do a reasonable job of protecting states’
interests, then everyone should be happy: the goals of federalism will
be met. We need not insist upon congressional authorization for
agency action, because everyone knows that Congress does not do a
104
very good job of protecting states’ interests. This view presupposes
that it is the Constitution’s underlying values that really matter—not
the particular mechanisms that we have traditionally relied upon to
vindicate those values. There is no reason to insist on Congress’s role

101. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1936.
102. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2099.
103. Id. at 2091.
104. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 20, at 223–27 (demolishing many of the traditional
arguments that the states’ representation in Congress protects the institutional interests of the
states); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (likening reliance on politics to
safeguard federalism to “reinforcing the walls of a sand castle as the tide returns”); William
Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 139, 147–52 (1998) (suggesting that changing political realities have undermined
what few political safeguards existed).
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as a protection for the states if the agencies are even better suited to
perform that role.
The Supreme Court rejected a very similar argument in Whitman
105
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. In that case, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had proposed that the
solution to the problem of broad delegations of power to agencies
was to require the agencies themselves to issue regulations
106
constraining their own exercise of the delegated authority. On
appeal, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected that suggestion:
We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a
limiting construction of the statute. . . . The idea that an agency can
cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by
declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally
contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to
exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that
Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden
legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power
is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has
no bearing upon the answer.107

105. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
106. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d
in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation involve an
unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without the constitutional
weakness is or may be available, our response is not to strike down the statute but to
give the agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own. Doing so
serves at least two of three basic rationales for the nondelegation doctrine. If the
agency develops determinate, binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise
the delegated authority arbitrarily. And such standards enhance the likelihood that
meaningful judicial review will prove feasible.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 6–8 (D.C. Cir.
1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (elaborating, on petition for rehearing,
upon the court’s prior delegation holding). The circuit court acknowledged that
[a] remand of this sort of course does not serve the third key function of
nondelegation doctrine, to “ensure[] to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.” The
agency will make the fundamental policy choices.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 175 F.3d at 1038 (alteration in original) (quoting Indus. Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
Nonetheless, the court found that sacrifice worth making because “the remand [would] ensure
that the courts not hold unconstitutional a statute that an agency, with the application of its
special expertise, could salvage.” Id.
107. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472–73.
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It is possible, of course, that the Court was wrong to dismiss so
quickly the D.C. Circuit’s innovative solution to the delegation
conundrum. But we do think American Trucking highlights the extent
to which our interlocutors’ proposal—that administrative mechanisms
can be substituted for legislative ones so long as underlying
constitutional values are served—is a departure from more familiar
forms of constitutional doctrine.
In defense of the constitutional legitimacy of their position, we
imagine that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger might make
108
two different arguments. First, they might say that the step they are
taking is fairly small and that we have exaggerated the extent of their
departure from more traditional assumptions about constitutional
structure. Second, they might simply insist that it is too late in the day
to challenge the constitutionality of the administrative state. We
address the first of these arguments in the remainder of this Section
and the second in the next.
Professor Metzger suggests that we have exaggerated the
conceptual distance between her view and ours when she notes that
“Congress is far from absent under the administrative law approach,
109
notwithstanding this approach’s primary focus on agencies.” She is
surely right to observe that, when we insist that “the central decision
110
to preempt state law [must] be meaningfully traceable to Congress,”
“[m]uch depends on the degree of clarity that ‘meaningful
111
traceability’ requires.” All the participants in this debate seem to
accept the proposition that the initial delegation of authority must
come from Congress, and none have questioned the nondelegation
doctrine’s vestigial requirement that such delegations be
accompanied by an “intelligible principle” that guides the exercise of
agency discretion. Metzger thus notes that:
administrative law enforcement of federalism does not lose the
political safeguards justification that animates process federalism
but instead amplifies the political safeguards available by giving
weight to state interests in executive branch policy debates as well

108. Both arguments, in fact, were advanced in our colloquy at the symposium. See
Symposium, 38th Annual Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium: Administrative
Law, Preemption, and Federalism, http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring08/students/
04152008.rm (Apr. 15, 2008).
109. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2094.
110. See supra text accompanying note 90.
111. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2094.
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as by rendering the effects of agency decisions on the states more
transparent and thus more subject to congressional oversight.112

We acknowledge that, in some respects, the administrative
agency mechanisms that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger
celebrate may add an additional layer of protection for federalism
within the executive branch, and we consider in Part III whether that
113
is a good thing. The important question for present purposes,
however, is whether our interlocutors’ proposals undermine the role
of Congress in protecting the states from federal preemption. That is
a hard question to evaluate as a matter of positive law simply because
the existing doctrine is so unsettled. But we think that what makes
these articles so original and interesting is precisely their suggestion
that current law’s focus (such as it is) on Congress is misplaced and
that constitutional values would be better served by shifting the
inquiry away from Congress and onto the structure and processes of
the agencies themselves. If administrative law really is “the new
federalism,” that suggests at least some degree of willingness to part
114
ways with the old legislative mechanisms.
Consider, for example, the current controversy over agency
regulations promulgated with preambles stating a broad view of the
federal law’s preemptive effect. Such preambles have been issued in a
variety of areas, including federal drug regulation, motor vehicle
115
regulation, and product safety. According to Professor Sharkey,
“[t]he regulatory preemption debate centers on the extent to which
the preambles go beyond simply reciting the preemptive effect of the

112. Id.
113. Professor Young thinks it is; Professor Benjamin thinks it isn’t. See infra p. 2113. Part
III also identifies ways in which these administrative mechanisms may provide considerably less
protection, as a practical matter, than an approach that insists upon congressional action. See
infra text accompanying notes 155–63.
114. Cf. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 242 (“Congressional intent is at
the heart of conventional preemption analysis.”).
115. See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (“FDA approval of labeling under the act . . . preempts conflicting or
contrary State law.”); Tresa Baldas, FDA’s Pre-emption Rule Splits the Courts, NAT’L L.J., Apr.
30, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1178183076770; Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 230–42 (surveying actions by the Food and Drug
Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission). Professor Sharkey suggests that “these preemption preambles
may be only the tip of the iceberg—a harbinger of a future where federal agency regulations
come armed with directives that displace competing or conflicting state regulations or common
law as a matter of course.” Id. at 227–28.
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governing statute or regulation promulgated within the agency’s
delegated authority, and instead attempt to discern the proper scope
116
of preemption with little or no direction from Congress.” On our
view of the law, such preambles would add relatively little to a
preemption inquiry; the preemptive effect of federal law would have
to be grounded in actions by Congress, not the agency’s judgment.
But it seems likely that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger
would approach the question quite differently by focusing on the
processes and reasoning of the agency itself. Unless we have
profoundly misread them, our interlocutors would care far less than
we would about the extremely attenuated role that Congress plays in
such cases.
In any event, our purpose here is not so much to prove our
symposium guests wrong as to insist on the continued primacy of
Congress in preemption decisions. To the extent that Professors
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger accept that primacy, we are certainly
happy to embrace them. But we suspect that the shift we detect in
these articles is, in fact, a meaningful one, and to that extent we hope
to provide a reminder that legislative authority must always be
grounded in action by the states’ representatives in Congress.
C. “That Ship Has Sailed”
The second possible answer to our critique raises the interesting
and difficult question of how one approaches the question of
constitutional limits on the administrative state. At one extreme, one
could conclude that the administrative state is hopelessly
unconstitutional and thus that no more further discussion need
117
occur. At the other extreme, one could decide that the basic
questions of separation of powers have been resolved in favor of
administrative agencies, so that contemporary constitutional debate
must take their legitimacy as given. Arguments like ours, which
continue to treat agencies as constitutionally suspect in at least some
important ways, are thus outside the scope of relevant constitutional
debate. We take this to be the position of Professors Galle,
Seidenfeld, and Metzger. It is not so much that the arguments against
broad delegation of authority to agencies are implausible, but rather

116. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 243.
117. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 2, at 1249 (stating that he is willing “to hold fast to the
Constitution though the heavens may fall”).
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that it is simply too late to make those arguments. That ship has
sailed.
This is, without a doubt, a plausible position. Neither of us—not
even Professor Benjamin, on his most Jacobin days—is eager to
uproot the administrative state, even if we were handed power to do
so. And although it is fun to play the curmudgeon and grumble about
the constitutional liberties taken during the New Deal and Great
Society, we also confess that we prefer our constitutional arguments
to be at least somewhat relevant to the world we actually live in.
Nonetheless, we think at least two answers are available to the “too
late” argument.
The first is that the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative
state rests on a set of awkward but durable intellectual compromises,
and we want to insist that those compromises remain deserving of
respect. Probably the most common line of argument in matters of
administrative law and federalism has gone as follows: don’t worry
about whatever change we are proposing, because there are still
unshakeable bulwarks that will always be there to protect the states.
When, for instance, the Supreme Court read the Commerce Clause so
broadly that “interstate commerce” encompassed anything that
118
looked like commerce, the reassuring response was that the political
safeguards of federalism still existed—that members of the House
and Senate are elected by states and units of states and those
119
members make the laws that govern commerce. Similarly, when
Congress started creating agencies that would have broad
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement authority, and thus
seemed to both delegate legislative power to entities outside
Congress and to combine legislative, judicial, and executive authority
in ways that seemed in tension with the separation of powers, the
reassuring response was that these agencies would not supplant
Congress or act on their own and judicial review would keep the
120
agencies within their statutory bounds. Congress would still make

118. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
119. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 15, at 546–52 (discussing the “crucial role [of the states]
in the selection and the composition of the national authority”); Kramer, supra note 20, at 234–
52 (updating Wechsler’s argument).
120. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 143 (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory
agencies . . . have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to
ensure agency fidelity to [Congress’s] statutory directives . . . .”).
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the decision of how much authority to give to agencies, so the buck
would stop there.
Scholars and judges thus reconciled the administrative state with
constitutional principles of both federalism and separation of powers
by emphasizing the key role of Congress. There is thus something
special about keeping the focus on Congress; that focus, in fact, is the
irreducible minimum that allows us to swallow the institutional
innovations of the last century. Given this intellectual history, one
cannot infer from the present acceptance of administrative agencies
that such agencies are substitutes for Congress or anything close to it.
They are subservient at best and unconstitutional at worst—that is,
whenever they lose their vital connection to the People’s elected
representatives.
To be sure, intermediate positions are often somewhat jerryrigged affairs, risking the appearance of ad hockery. We have said
that preemption decisions must be “meaningfully traceable” to
Congress itself—a formula that would hardly be self-applying in
121
practical contexts. But even if we could identify a more specific limit
on shifting preemptive power to agencies, why draw the line there
and not somewhere else? The anti-Frostians might say that once we
have allowed agencies to exist, we have given up on our principles
and thus our ability to take a principled stand—in for a penny, in for a
pound.
Again, this is an intellectually plausible position. But it does not
reflect the dominant current of American constitutional thought over
the past three quarters of a century. The administrative state has
always rested on awkward compromises, and our insistence on
Congress’s primacy is firmly grounded in that settlement. The
positions advanced by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger here
may offer an advance in terms of intellectual purity, but they risk
untethering the administrative state from its established intellectual
moorings. If the understanding we outlined in the previous paragraph
is not operative, then one must return to the status quo ante and
discuss the legitimacy of the basic institutional arrangements upon
which one’s ideas are premised. One cannot, in our view, shove
Congress aside without justifying the constitutional vision that
renders that action legitimate.
121. One of us has tried to flesh out this principle elsewhere, see Young, Executive
Preemption, supra note 23, at 886–88, but Professor Benjamin would no doubt flesh it out quite
differently—thereby underscoring the difficulty of the enterprise.
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Our second rejoinder emphasizes continuing ferment rather than
settled understandings. Although the basic legitimacy of the
administrative state is no longer in doubt, practically speaking, not all
questions are so settled. This is particularly true in the area of
administrative federalism, in which the Supreme Court is just
beginning to explore the relationship between its administrative law
jurisprudence and its doctrines protecting state autonomy. The Court
has not, for example, definitively settled the level of deference owing
122
to an agency when it reads its organic statute to preempt state law,
and it has yet to consider the effect of broadly preemptive
“preambles” issued by an agency with relatively tenuous grounding in
the underlying statute. These are questions that can still go either
way. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the proagency positions on these
issues—which would, for instance, largely supplant the current
widespread use of state tort law as a supplementary mechanism for
promoting consumer safety—pose the greater danger to settled
expectations.
The two of us may disagree over the extent to which
consolidating regulatory authority over product safety or similar
issues would be a good thing. We are content to agree, however, that
it would be a new thing. It may be fair to say that “that ship has
sailed” when speaking of basic delegations of authority to federal
agencies. But on the finer points of administrative federalism, we still
have time to bomb those ships in the harbor.
III. PROTECTING FEDERALISM IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Thus far we have argued that the focus of administrative
federalism doctrine should remain on Congress, because that is where
the Constitution focuses. In this last Part, we broaden our own focus
from the issue of fidelity to hardwired constitutional mechanisms to
an assessment of how an “administrative law”–based approach might
affect underlying constitutional values of federalism. We suggest,
first, that downplaying Congress’s role would undermine state
autonomy to a greater degree than our interlocutors seem to think.
Second, we consider the potential benefits to state autonomy of
administrative law protections, if those protections are added as a

122. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (avoiding the
question as “academic”).
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supplement to, rather than a substitute for, an insistence on
Congress’s primary role.
Our discussion in this Part is complicated by a normative
disagreement about the desirability of protecting state autonomy per
se. One of us believes that constitutional fidelity means adherence not
only to particular institutional mechanisms in the text (e.g.,
Congress’s lead role in lawmaking) but also to the Constitution’s
underlying commitment to balance between national and state
123
power. The other denies the pull of such broader structural
principles and is skeptical that state autonomy warrants protection as
a normative matter. This disagreement has implications for how we
view both the current doctrine that our interlocutors would
undermine and the administrative law-based safeguards for
federalism that they would develop. Throughout this Part, we try to
make explicit where we differ and how those differences cash out.
A. Congress and the Procedural Safeguards of Federalism
The Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress and
creates difficult hurdles for legislative action. These textual provisions
are critical elements of the Constitution’s protection of federalism. As
Bradford Clark has explained, these procedures safeguard federalism
in two distinct respects. The first is representational or political in
nature:
Federal lawmaking procedures safeguarded federalism . . . by
assigning power to adopt “the supreme Law of the Land” solely to
entities subject to “the political safeguards of federalism”—that is,
the states’ “strategic role to the selection of Congress and the
President.” These procedures enhanced the influence of the states
by giving federal institutions designed to represent state interests—
such as the Senate—a veto over all forms of federal
lawmaking . . . .124

This is the familiar “political safeguards of federalism” argument that
125
Herbert Wechsler popularized and the Supreme Court endorsed in
126
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. But as

123. See generally Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1762–75.
124. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1330–31 (2001) (quoting Wechsler, supra note 15, at 544).
125. See Wechsler, supra note 15, passim.
126. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985).
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Professor Clark points out, federal lawmaking procedures also serve a
distinct function: “[t]hese procedures safeguard federalism on one
level simply by requiring agreement among multiple actors, thus
making the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Laws,’ and ‘Treaties’ of the United States
127
relatively difficult to adopt.”
128
It is true, as Carlos Vázquez recently pointed out, that the
difficulty of navigating the national lawmaking process simply
entrenches the status quo at the federal level by making changes to
federal law difficult. If the federal government is already regulating in
a given area, these inertia-based limits may thus entrench federal
power by thwarting devolutionary impulses that might return
authority to the states. Relying on federal inertia to protect state
autonomy thus entails a predictive judgment about the relative
frequency of federal initiatives that expand or contract national
power. We are fairly comfortable, however, in predicting that the
former will exceed the latter in both frequency and importance.
We refer to the two principles we have identified as the
“political” and “procedural” safeguards of federalism, respectively.
These lawmaking procedures were never intended to be the only
constitutional means of protecting state autonomy, of course. The
Framers also relied upon the doctrine of enumerated powers,
underscored by the Tenth Amendment’s command that “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
129
people.”
But contemporaneous commentary underscores the
central place of the Constitution’s lawmaking procedures in the
130
Framers’ strategy for protecting federalism.

127. Clark, supra note 124, at 1330; see also MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE
COMPOUND REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN FEDERALISM 28 (2001) (observing that inertiabased limits on federal action protect state autonomy because “[t]he states are the ‘default
setting’ of the American federal system”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 32–33) (discussing federalism implications of the
“enactment costs” of federal legislation).
128. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4–5).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600–01 (1995)
(invalidating the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as outside the limits of Congress’s
Commerce Power); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (stating that “[t]he
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated”).
130. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 & 46, at 311, 317–18 (James Madison) (emphasizing
the importance of the states’ representation in the federal lawmaking process); Letter from
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Neither the political nor the procedural safeguards inherent in
the lawmaking process work very well if law is, in fact, made in other
131
ways. Hence, the Court’s delegation decisions continue to insist that
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
132
conform.’” Likewise, the modern Court has kept its focus firmly on
Congress when considering the scope and validity of federal
133
intrusions on state autonomy. And although the Court has held that
Congress may regulate “the states as states,” even when they are
134
performing traditional state government functions, the Court has
also required a clear statement of Congress’s intent to accomplish
such regulation:
[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain
that Congress intended such an exercise. “To give the statedisplacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity
would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia
relied to protect states’ interests.”135

James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
383, 395–96 (1910) (“As a security of the rights & powers of the States in their individual
capacities, ag[ainst] an undue preponderance of the powers granted to the Government over
them in their united capacity, the Constitution has relied on . . . [t]he responsibility of the
Senators and Representatives in the Legislature of the U. S. to the Legislatures & people of the
States.”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348–51 (James Madison) (emphasizing that
checks and balances, including checks built into the lawmaking process, would preserve balance
among competing institutions); Clark, supra note 124, at 1346–67 (surveying the founding
debates over the Supremacy Clause and the Constitution’s lawmaking procedures).
131. Clark, supra note 124, at 1331 (explaining that these institutional dynamics “suggest
that the Founders understood constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures to establish the
exclusive means of adopting ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”).
132. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its
will to delegate certain authority. . . . The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the
understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no
more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”).
133. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (holding a state
banking law preempted but focusing on the statutory text, not the agency’s judgment).
134. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
135. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between
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In preemption cases, the Court continues to invoke—and, somewhat
more sporadically, to follow—a “presumption against preemption,”
which holds that “[i]n areas of traditional state regulation, we assume
that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has
136
made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’” Likewise, the Court
has been unwilling to defer to administrative agency interpretations
of federal statutes when those readings supplant state authority in
137
fields of traditional state regulation, and it has held that preemptive
federal regulation at the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power
must come from the legislative body itself, not an administrative
138
agency.
Note that nothing we have said so far dictates how we should
determine Congress’s intent, and we think reasonable minds can
differ. One might decide, for example, simply to use ordinary
methods of statutory construction to determine whether Congress
intended to preempt or to give an agency the power of preemption.
Indeed, the two of us disagree as to the desirability of the various
clear statement rules just invoked. One of us is a big fan, who has
defended clear statement requirements as “resistance norms” that can
compensate for the underenforcement of federalism and other
139
structural values;
for him, clear statement rules form the
cornerstone of a viable approach to judicial enforcement of

the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985))).
136. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
137. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–22, 925 (2006) (rejecting the attorney
general’s interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act to ban physician assisted suicide, in
part, because “such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by
the States’ police power” was unlikely).
138. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172 (2001) (“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”). Similar
clear statement rules apply when Congress supplants neutral state procedural rules in
association with federal claims brought in state court, see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372
(1990), when Congress, in the exercise of its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
abrogates state sovereign immunity from private suits for money damages, see Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 242, and when Congress affixes conditions to grants of federal funds, see Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
139. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000).
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140

The other of us remains skeptical of canons of
federalism.
construction and would prefer to ascertain the intent of Congress
141
through more traditional modes of statutory construction. But we
do agree that the Court’s employment of clear statement rules in a
variety of contexts reflects the traditional—and in our view plainly
correct—notion that Congress must make the critical decisions
142
concerning the federal/state balance. Our disagreement is about
how Congress’s intent should be ascertained, not where the focus of
inquiry should lie.
We also agree that, by minimizing Congress’s role, Professors
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger would substantially undermine the
states’ position. The constitutionally-mandated lawmaking process
protects state autonomy in two distinct respects—politically and
procedurally—and the arguments of our interlocutors only go to one
143
of them. If the states really do have significant opportunities to
press their interests and exercise political leverage within the federal
administrative process, that might ameliorate concerns about
circumventing the political safeguards in Congress. But Professors
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger all concede that it is far easier to enact
federal law through administrative processes than through
144
legislation. Agency action, quite simply, leaves the inertia-driven
procedural safeguards of federalism in the dust.
The two of us are not completely on the same page concerning
the desirability, as a policy matter, of these inertia-based safeguards.
But we do agree that they play a major role in the constitutional
scheme for protecting federalism. The difficulty of enacting federal
law is what fuels the basic presupposition of our system that
[f]ederal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal

140. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at 123–27. For a particular application of
this approach to administrative federalism, see generally Young, Executive Preemption, supra
note 23.
141. For an example of this approach to administrative law, see generally Benjamin & Rai,
supra note 48.
142. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“In traditionally sensitive areas,
such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in
the judicial decision.” (emphasis added)).
143. See supra Part III.A.
144. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1971; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra
note 79, at 738.
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systems of the states. . . . Congress acts, in short, against the
background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way
that a state legislature acts against the background of the common
law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.145

To the extent that this “interstitial” view of federal law has become
146
dated,
that development is largely owing to the advent of
nonlegislative lawmaking processes, including not only administrative
agency action but also federal common lawmaking, which evade the
burdens of overcoming inertia inherent in the Article I legislative
process. It is important to recognize, in assessing the administrative
process’s adequacy as a federalism surrogate, that that process
provides little substitute for the procedural safeguards of federalism.
B. The Administrative Safeguards of Federalism?
We have argued that, in administrative federalism cases, the
focus should be on exactly what Congress authorized the agencies to
do. That is what we believe the Constitution commands. Functional
considerations at the agency level are interesting, and they are
important in lots of situations. But we believe that the first question
in any analysis must be what Congress intended.
By eliding this question, Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and
Metzger leave us in a strange place. If the Constitution does not
constrain (as opposed to merely suggest ideas to) Congress and
agencies, what meaningful limit exists? A doctrine from
administrative law is illustrative here. The Administrative Procedure
Act says that its constraints do not apply if “agency action is
147
committed to agency discretion by law.” The Court has found that
this exception arises “in those rare instances where ‘statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
148
apply.’” In such situations, the Court has held that it cannot impose
any limits on the agency’s exercise of its discretion because it has no
145. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 494–95 (5th ed. 2003)
(quoting the first edition); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 495–98 (1954).
146. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 145, at 495 (“In the fifty years since the First
Edition was published, the expansion of federal legislation and administrative regulation . . . has
accelerated . . . .”).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).
148. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citing S.
REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
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legal basis for doing so. It seems to us that Galle, Seidenfeld, and
Metzger have similarly left courts (and everyone else) without any
law to apply in considering the adequacy of agencies’ efforts to
accommodate federalism concerns. They have suggested the
federalism principles can give some guidance to agencies, but they
have not indicated how we would ever determine that agencies have
acted unlawfully. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw. In some
situations there really is no law to apply. But here there is law to
apply—the Constitution—and it provides some constraints. We are
being asked to abandon those constraints and replace them with . . .
well, nothing.
Our view still leaves a role for functionalism. In some situations
we might conclude that the best reading of a statute is that Congress
delegated broad authority to an agency that it could choose to
exercise in a variety of ways (preempting and otherwise), so there
would be no constitutional question of the sort we are describing.
Congress would have spoken with whatever is the requisite amount of
clarity to the agency, and the policy question would then be whether
we, as citizens, should want the agency to make a certain decision, or
whether we should prefer that it be made by courts or Congress. That
is, once the constitutional question is removed, we can discuss the
policy question of what our preferences should be. But our point is
that the constitutional question comes first, and only if it is answered
in the affirmative can we then move to the normative question.
This goes to the question of the usefulness of the sort of
functional analysis that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger
engage in. The point of their analysis (and in particular Galle and
Seidenfeld’s), is that agencies may protect state interests better than
Congress would, so we should feel fine about agencies making
preemption decisions on their own. In our view, this sort of analysis is
not sufficient, and it may not even be necessary. It is not sufficient
because, as we have noted already, no matter how solicitous agencies
may be of states’ interests, we believe that the best understanding of
the Constitution is that Congress must make the central judgments.
Even if agencies were, as a factual matter, clearly superior to
Congress in protecting states’ interests, it would not change the fact

149. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (holding, in the case of a Central
Intelligence Agency employee who was fired because of his sexual orientation, that there was
no law to apply under the Administrative Procedure Act but the plaintiff’s constitutional claims
were reviewable).
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that the Constitution requires the basic decisions to be made by
Congress.
One of us (Professor Benjamin) would go further to say that all
this functional analysis is not necessary because, once we have gotten
past the initial question—that is, once we have concluded that
Congress authorized the agency to preempt, or authorized the agency
to decide to preempt—we do not need to consider the degree to
which agencies protect states’ interests. The policy analysis certainly
can include such considerations, but they are not, in any sense,
required. This view holds that considering state interests in the mix of
policy concerns can be a valuable element of agencies’ overall
decisionmaking process, but it need not be a central or separable
element. Congress should make the relevant decisions regarding
states’ interests, and once it has done so the degree of protection of
states provided by agencies simply is not terribly important.
The other of us (Professor Young) thinks that the constitutional
150
obligation to protect federalism is considerably more demanding.
That obligation includes two distinct components: first, to observe the
entrenched structural mechanisms that the Constitution builds in,
such as the representation of the states in Congress and the
arduousness of the Article I legislative process; and second, to respect
the Constitution’s more general commitment to balance the
meaningful sovereign roles of both national and state governments.
This latter commitment is frequently observed by institutional
innovation outside the canonical Constitution—for example, when
the federal courts formulate judge-made abstention doctrines that
151
protect the role of the state courts. Although this view has been
developed primarily in the context of the courts’ obligation to
formulate federalism-protective doctrine, the political branches take
the same oath to preserve the Constitution and, in fact, have
frequently observed that obligation by promulgating statutes,
regulations, and practices that protect federalism in ways not directly
152
mandated by the canonical document. The functional analysis that

150. See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1762–99.
151. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 (1971) (developing a doctrine of
equitable abstention to protect the autonomy of state judicial proceedings from federal
interference); Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1775–83 (discussing the
need for and historical extent of extraconstitutional innovation to protect the federal balance).
152. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 429–36 (discussing the roles of
statutes and regulations in defining the federal balance).
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Professors Galle and Seidenfeld offer, and the doctrinal suggestions
that Professor Metzger puts forward, are tremendously helpful in
153
terms of vindicating these commitments.
We hasten to add, however, that the administrative safeguards of
federalism will be helpful to state autonomy only if they act as a
supplement to, not a substitute for, existing rules of Congressional
primacy. We have already suggested that it is far from clear that
agencies are “just as good” as Congress at protecting interests of state
autonomy. There is a robust debate about exactly what agency
officials maximize, and thus what sort of behavior we should expect
154
from them. This debate has been largely theoretical, as it is difficult
to construct rigorous empirical benchmarks for testing various
theories of officials’ motivations. But the lack of empirical clarity
about officials’ goals should not obscure the historical reality of the
increase in agencies’ power, often at the expense of states. Simply
stated, notwithstanding Professors Seidenfeld and Galle’s abstract
points of comparative institutional analysis, the vast expansion of the
federal administrative state over the last century—much of it driven
by decisions taken at the agency level—is res ipsa loquitur. Moreover,
this expansion has occurred despite the existence of both the judicial
focus on grounding administrative activity in congressional action and
the federalism-protective features of the agency process itself that
Galle and Seidenfeld invoke. Galle and Seidenfeld give us no reason
to conclude that, despite the spotty record of both sets of safeguards
in limiting national aggrandizement, removing one of those
safeguards will enhance state autonomy.
Likewise, although Professor Metzger offers a creative and
extremely interesting glimpse of administrative law’s potential to
protect federalism, we expect she would acknowledge that the

153. See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1771–75 (suggesting that
courts may well have a constitutional obligation to formulate federalism-protective doctrines to
compensate for the enumerated powers doctrine’s failure to constrain national authority).
154. Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 114 (1971) (arguing that agency officials will expand their budgets and power
because “the coterminous relation of a bureaucrat’s rewards and his position implies that a
bureaucrat will maximize the total budget of his bureau”), with Daryl J. Levinson, EmpireBuilding in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932 (2005) (disagreeing with the agency
“empire-building hypothesis,” and stating that “[e]ven if most bureaucrats were primarily
interested in lining their own pockets, the relationship between a larger agency budget and
higher salaries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous”); see also Stuart Minor
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008) (manuscript at 41–44) (discussing this debate).
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evidence that administrative law actually plays this role at present is
pretty thin. The cases she discusses are not all that encouraging. The
federalism-protective aspect of Alaska Department of Environmental
155
156
157
Conservation v. EPA was offered in dissent. Gonzales v. Oregon
involved a particularly blatant power grab by executive officials
seeking to do what Congress had explicitly refused to do and involved
158
a particularly sensitive area of state policy experimentation; if
anything, the Court’s opinions distressingly suggest the case was
159
160
closer than it should have been. Massachusetts v. EPA was a case
about standing, not regulatory authority, and the special role of the
161
states played a relatively minor role in the decision. And both
162
163
Gonzales v. Raich and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. were big
defeats for state regulatory autonomy. We always respect the ability
to make lemonade out of the lemons life gives you, but these are the
cases from which we are supposed to conclude that administrative law
will protect federalism?
CONCLUSION
There is perhaps an irony in our critique of Professors Galle,
Seidenfeld, and Metzger: one of us (the hidebound Burkean) would
require a clear statement from Congress before interpreting a statute
as giving an agency the authority to preempt or the authority to
decide to preempt. The other one (the Jacobin) would not require
any sort of clear statement and would instead resort to ordinary tools
of statutory construction. So, in reality, our interpretive techniques
would yield different answers in many (perhaps most) cases. But we
155. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
156. See id. at 517–18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
158. See id. at 911 (acknowledging the “earnest and profound debate about the morality,
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 735 (1997))).
159. Three Justices dissented, after all. See id. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., &
Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
161. See id. at 1454–55 (discussing Massachusetts’s “special position” as a litigant rather than
a regulator for standing purposes).
162. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (interpreting the Commerce Clause
broadly to permit federal regulation of homegrown marijuana use, thereby nullifying
California’s medical marijuana).
163. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1573 (2007) (holding that the
National Banking Act leaves little room for state regulation of the “business of banking”).
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agree on the foundational interpretive point that the constitutional
decisions to employ certain mechanisms are just as mandatory as the
underlying values that those decisions seek to protect. Expanding this
institutional array is often permissible and may even be essential, but
this element of realism does not legitimate marginalizing the
institutions that the Constitution does specify. To the extent that
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger shift the focus away from Congress’s
role in the lawmaking process to that of administrative agencies, they
exceed the limits of constitutional flexibility. We want to keep the
focus where the Constitution does.

